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Abstract
It is often assumed that the problem with 'virtual reality'—the concept, its
various technological deployments, and the apparently oxymoronic phrase
itself—has been our understanding, or perhaps misunderstanding, of the
virtual.  The real problem, however, is not with the virtual; it is with the real
itself.  This essay investigates the undeniably useful but ultimately mistaken
and somewhat misguided concept of the real that has been routinely
operationalized in investigations of new media technology.  The specific
point of contact for the examination is the avatar.  What is at issue here is
not the complicated structures and articulations of avatar identity but the
assumed 'real thing' that is said to be its ultimate cause and referent.  In
addressing this subject, the essay considers three theories of the real,
extending from Platonism to the recent innovations of Slavoj Žižek, and
investigates their effect on our understanding of computer-generated
experience and social interaction.
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One of the more compelling and persistent social issues regarding computer-mediated communication
(CMC) has to do with user proxies or avatars.  The word 'avatar,' which is of Sanskrit origin denoting
incarnation or the physical embodiment of the divine, has been utilized, at least since Neil Stephenson's
Snow Crash (2000) and the 'many-player online virtual environment' of LucasFilms Habitat (Morningstar
and Farmer, 1991, p. 274), to designate the virtual representative of a user in a text-based multiple user
domain (MUD), a massive multiplayer online role playing game (MMORPG), a non-gaming 3D
immersive environment like Second Life, or a social network like Facebook, MySpace, and LinkedIn.  'At
its core,' as Mark Meadows (2008) succinctly describes it, 'an avatar is a simple thing…It is an
interactive, social representation of a user' (p. 23).  As is clear from the technical, popular, and critical
literature on this subject, what makes the avatar remarkable is that users have the ability to manipulate its
appearance, attributes, and characteristics, either creating it in their own image or engaging in
imaginative and often fanciful constructions.  'For some players,' as Nick Yee (2008) points out, 'the
avatar becomes a purposeful projection or idealization of their own identity, while for others, the avatar
is an experiment with new identities.'
Critical responses to this have pulled in two different directions.  On the one hand, the ability to
manipulate avatar characteristics is celebrated as a means by which to liberate one's self from the
unfortunate accidents imposed by real physical bodies situated in geo-physical space.  Indicative of this
kind of response is Mark Dery's (1994) introduction to Flame Wars, one of the first critical anthologies
addressing CMC: 'The upside of incorporeal interaction: a technologically enabled, postmulticultural
vision of identity disengaged from gender, ethnicity, and other problematic constructions.  On line, users
can float free of biological and sociocultural determinants' (p. 3).  On the other hand, critics point out
how this activity not only neglects the limitations and exigencies of real physical bodies but reproduces,
as Sandy Stone (1991) and others have argued, some of the worst forms of Cartesian thinking.  'By virtue
of being physically disembodied from the creator,' Beth Simone Noveck (2006) argues, 'avatars in the
theater of the game space may act in antisocial and even pathological ways— ways in which the "real"
person never would— shooting, maiming, and killing in brutal fashion' (pp. 269-270).  Additionally, and
perhaps worse, researchers like Lisa Nakamura (1995 and 2002) and Jennifer Gonzáles (2000) have
demonstrated how avatar identity often times reproduces, reinforces, and trades on conventional and
highly problematic stereotypes of race, ethnicity, and gender.  By means of this rather disturbing form of
'identity tourism,' as Nakamura (2002) calls it, users 'use race and gender as amusing prostheses to be
donned and shed without "real life" consequences' (p. 13-14).
As long as inquiry remains defined by the terms and conditions of this debate very little will
change.  Investigators will continue to deploy and entertain what is by now easily recognizable
arguments, somewhat predictable evidence, and, in the final analysis, unresolved controversies.  For this
reason, the following undertakes another approach and method of analysis.  This alternative does not, it
is important to note, simply dismiss the controversy concerning avatar identity, but reconsiders it from an
altogether different perspective.  Instead of adhering to and operating within the terms stipulated by the
current debate, we can also fix on and question what they already agree upon and hold in common.  Such
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an investigation would target not the differences between the enthusiastic supporters of creative role
playing and the critics of virtual violence, antisocial behavior, and identity tourism but the shared values
and assumptions that both sides must endorse, whether conscious of it or not, in order to engage each
other and enter into conversation in the first place.  Specifically, both sides, despite their differing
interpretations, deploy and leverage a particular understanding of the real.  In fact, these discussions of
and debates about computer-mediated social interaction throw around the words 'real' and 'reality' with
relative ease.  They not only distinguish the endlessly reconfigurable designer bodies of avatars from the
real person who stands behind it and manipulates the digital strings but, when push comes to shove, when
things in the virtual environment get confused or exceedingly complicated, advocates and critics alike
often appeal to the relatively safe and well-defined world of what is now called in a curious recursive,
discursive gesture 'real reality.'  Consequently, what is needed is an examination of the common
understanding of the 'real' that has been operationalized in these various discussions and disputes.  The
objective of such an investigation is not to engage in philosophical speculation about the nature of
reality.  The goal, rather, is to get real about computer-generated experience and social interaction,
providing this relatively new area of study with a more sophisticated and nuanced understanding of some
of its own key terms and fundamental concepts.
Will The Real Please Stand Up?
Let's begin at the beginning—at that point when the avatar is first recognized as a significant social issue.
Although there is some debate about the exact point of entry, one text has been routinely credited as the
source, Sandy Stone's 'Will the Real Body Please Stand Up?'  This essay, which was initially presented at
the First International Conference on Cyberspace (4-5 May 1990, University of Texas at Austin),
investigated the new opportunities and challenges introduced by the nascent virtual communities that had
developed in bulletin board systems (BBS) and first-generation computer conferencing services like
Compuserv.  In the course of her analysis, Stone (1991) introduces readers to Julie, 'a person on a
computer conference in New York in 1985' (p. 82).  Julie, as Stone describes her, was a severely disabled
woman who compensated for her physical limitations by engaging in rather intimate conversations
online.  She was a gregarious woman who, despite being trapped in a ruined physical body, was able to
carry on a full and very active social life in cyberspace.  The only problem, as Stone eventually points
out, was Julie did not really exist.  She was, in fact, the avatar of a rather shy and introverted middle-aged
male psychiatrist who decided to experiment with online identity and what Stone (1991) called 'computer
cross-dressing' (p. 84).  The case of Julie, therefore, was not just one of the earliest recorded accounts of
avatar identity crisis but introduced what is widely considered to be one of the principal issues
concerning online social interaction—the difference between avatar appearance and the true identity of
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the real person behind the scene/screen.  The full impact of this is perhaps best articulated by Kim
Randall on a blog, which documents her experiences in Second Life.  'How does one know,' Randall
(2008) inquires, 'what is truth and reality when dealing, playing and working in a virtual world?  The
reason I am writing this is due to the fact that at some point we all question someone's honesty when in
all reality you cannot see the person, only the avatar of someone you may talk to or work with in a virtual
world.'  Randall's inquiry is direct, intuitive, and seemingly very simple.  Responding to it, however, will
entail an engagement with a whole lot of metaphysics.  Rather than engage this material directly, we can
get at it by following the trail of Stone's evocative title—'Will the Real Body Please Stand Up?'
This title alludes to a popular television game show.  The show, To Tell the Truth, was created by
Bob Stewart, produced by the highly successful production team of Mark Goodson and Bill Todman, and
ran intermittently on several U.S. television networks since its premier in the mid-1950's.  To Tell the
Truth was a panel show, which like its precursor What's My Line? (1950-1967), featured a panel of four
celebrities, who were confronted with a group of three individuals or challengers.  Each challenger
claimed to be one particular individual who had some unusual background, notable life experience, or
unique occupation.  The celebrity panel was charged with interrogating the trio and deciding, based on
the responses to their questions, which one of the three was actually the person s/he purported to be—
who, in effect, was telling the truth.  In this exchange, two of the challengers engaged in deliberate
deception, answering the questions of the celebrity panel by pretending to be someone they were not,
while the remaining challenger told the truth.  The 'moment of truth' came at the game's conclusion, when
the program's host asked the pivotal question, 'Will the real so-and-so please stand up?' at which time one
of the three challengers stood.  In doing so, this one individual revealed him/herself as the real thing and
exposed the other two as imposters.
Although ostensibly a form of simple entertainment, To Tell the Truth is based on and stages
some of the fundamental concerns of Western metaphysics.  First, it differentiates and distinguishes
between the real thing and its phenomenal appearances.  According to the program's structure, the real
thing is not only obscured by what appears and is presented to the panel, but it is situated just below,
behind, or outside the surface of these apparitions.  Consequently, there is a real thing.  It is, however,
hidden or concealed by various competing and somewhat unreliable appearances.  Second, in the face of
these different apparitions, the panelists attempt to ascertain what is real by interrogating the appearances
and looking for significant inconsistencies, incongruities, and even betrayals within phenomenal reality.
The panelists, therefore, scrutinize the appearances in order to determine, by a kind of process of
elimination, what is real and what is not.  Third, the effectiveness of this particular undertaking can be
evaluated by comparing each panelist's final judgment to the real thing.  This means that the panelists
will, at some point in the program, have access to the real itself.  At some point, then, namely at the end
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of the program, the real thing can be made to stand up, to show itself as itself, so that one may have direct
and unmitigated access to it.  Finally, once the real thing is revealed, the four panelists (and the viewing
audience) will know which appearances were truthful and which were false.  They will come to know
who among the challengers had been telling the truth and who was lying, who among the four panelists
judged correctly and who did not, and, most importantly, what is real and what is merely an illusory
deception and fiction.
This is, as any student of philosophy will recognize, the basic configuration typically attributed
to Platonic metaphysics.  For mainstream Platonism, the real is situated outside of and beyond
phenomenal reality.  That is, the real things are located in the realm of supersensible ideas and what is
perceived by embodied and finite human beings are derived and somewhat deficient apparitions.  This
Platonic arrangement, although well over 2400 years old, also informs and is operative in recent debates
about avatars and user identity.  First, we commonly distinguish the appearances of avatars that populate
the computer-generated environment from the true identity of the user.  Avatars, as users, developers, and
researchers recognize, are 'representational proxies that may or may not reflect the physical attributes of
their controllers' (Lastowka & Hunter, 2006, p. 15).  There is then, as Thomas Boellstorff (2008)
describes it, a 'gap between virtual and actual self' (p. 120) and 'a broadly shared cultural assumption that
virtual selfhood is not identical to actual selfhood' (119).  This 'broadly shared cultural assumption' is
visually exhibited in Robbie Cooper's Alter Ego (2007), a book of seventy composite portraits that
picture computer gamers from the United States, Europe, China, and Japan alongside images of their
avatars, 'graphically dramatizing,' as it states on the book's back cover, 'the gap between fantasy and
reality.'  Although this exhibition is entirely inline with the formal structure of Platonism, there is, it is
important to note, something of a revision of the original material.  For Platonism, the real thing was
determined to be the supersensible ideas, and what confronted finite and embodied human beings through
the means of the senses was considered an insubstantial apparition and shadowy representation (Plato,
1987).  For CMC researchers and participants, however, the terms are inverted.  The real things are,
following post-enlightenment innovations in epistemology and the empirical methodology patronized by
modern science, assumed to be the physical world and the actual objects and people inhabiting it.  The
appearances, by contrast, are the insubstantial and manifold representations of these things, which are
projected into and simulated by the computer-generated environment.
Second, in order for this ontological difference, as philosophers call it, to show itself as such, one
would need access not just to the appearance of something but to the real thing as it is in itself.  In other
words, the appearance is only able to be recognized as such and to show itself as an appearance on the
basis of some knowledge of the real thing.  Although this sounds a bit abstract, it can be easily
explicated, as Slavoj Žižek (2002) has so often demonstrated in his own work, by way of a joke.  In a
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now well-known and often reproduced New Yorker cartoon by Peter Steiner (1993), two dogs sit in front
of an Internet-connected PC.  The one operating the computer says to his companion, 'On the Internet,
nobody knows you're a dog' (p. 61).  The cartoon has often been employed to illustrate the problems of
identity and anonymity in CMC.  As Richard Holeton (1998) interprets it, 'the cartoon makes fun of the
anonymity of network communications by showing a dog online, presumably fooling some credulous
humans about its true identity' (p. 111).  The cartoon, however, is only comical on the basis of a crucial
and necessary piece of information—we see that it is really a dog behind the computer screen and
keyboard.  Without access to this information, the cartoon would not work; it would not make sense.  
Access to this 'real thing' can be, as the game shows of Goodson and Todman demonstrate,
provided in one of two ways.  On the one hand, the real may be revealed a priori as is the case with
What's My Line?, Goodson and Todman's initial panel show.  In What's My Line?, four celebrity panelists
interrogated one challenger in an attempt to ascertain this particular individual's occupation or line of
work.  Although the true identity of the challenger was concealed from the celebrity panel, it was
revealed to both the studio and television audience in advance of the start of game play.  In this situation,
then, the real thing would have been available prior to the subsequent involvement with its various
appearances.  This is the approach that is typically operative with social networking applications like
Facebook, MySpace, and instant messenger (IM), which are often utilized by university students to
maintain contact with friends and acquaintances.  Since users of these communication technologies, as
Nakamura (2007) points out, 'already know the identities of their interlocutors' (p. 49), they are able to
evaluate whether their friend's avatar, a Facebook profile or an IM screen name, is an accurate portrayal
of the real person or not.  On the other hand, access to the real can be situated a posteriori, as is
demonstrated in To Tell the Truth.  In this situation, the real is made available and exposed as such only
after a considerable engagement with appearances.  This is the experience commonly reported by Internet
users who initiate contact online and then endeavor to meet each other face-to-face (F2F) in real life
(RL).  The outcome of such RL meetings is either pleasantly surprising, as one comes to realize that the
real person is pretty much what one had expected, or terribly disturbing, as it becomes clear that the real
person is nothing like he or she pretended to be.  The former is evident, for example, in the marketing
campaigns of next-gen computer-dating services like e-Harmony.com and Match.com.  While the latter
has gained considerable popularity in press coverage of police sting operations, where law enforcement
agents, posing as underage minors online, arrange RL rendezvous with sexual predators, scam artists, and
pedophiles.  Whether access is provided a priori or a posteriori, knowledge of the real as it is in itself is
essential for distinguishing and evaluating avatar identity.
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Critical Complications
Differentiating between the real thing and its multifaceted appearances is clearly an effective and useful
method for negotiating, as Sherry Turkle (1995) calls it, 'identity in the age of the Internet.'  This
essentially Platonic configuration, however, is not beyond critique and there are, it turns out, good
reasons to be skeptical of the precedent it imposes on our thinking.  Such critical perspective has been
advanced by Immanuel Kant, the progenitor of 'critical philosophy' and the individual who, according to
Žižek (2001, p. 160), occupies a unique pivotal position in the history of Western thought.  Kant (1965),
following the Platonic precedent, differentiates between the object as it appears to us—finite and
embodied human beings—through the mediation of our senses and the thing as it is in-itself (B xxvii).
Human beings are restricted to the former, while the latter remains, for us at least, forever
unapproachable.  'What objects may be in themselves, and apart from all this receptivity of our
sensibility, remains completely unknown to us.  We know nothing but our mode of perceiving them'
(Kant, 1965, A 42/B 59).  Despite the complete and absolute inaccessibility of the thing itself, Kant
(1965) still 'believes' in its existence: 'But our further contention must also be duly borne in mind, namely
that though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to
think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can
be appearances without anything that appears' (B xxvi).  Consequently, Kant redeploys the Platonic
distinction between the real thing and its appearances, adding the further qualification that access to the
real thing is, if we are absolutely careful in defining the proper use and limits of our cognitive abilities,
forever restricted and beyond us.
It follows from this that if Kant's critical philosophy had been employed in the design of To Tell
the Truth, the game show would have been pretty much the same with one crucial difference.  There
would be a celebrity panel, who seek to know the truth through interrogation, and three challengers, who
present this panel with various and competing appearances.  At the moment of truth, however, the final
gesture would be truncated.  When the host asks the question 'will the real so-and-so please stand up?' no
one would respond; none of the challengers would stand and be recognized as the real thing.  Instead, the
panel and the audience would be confronted with the fact that finite human beings are unable to know the
thing as it truly is in itself.  This does not mean, however, that there is no real thing.  He/she/it would in
fact exist, and Kant would be the first to insist upon it.  He would, however, be just as strict on insisting
that this real thing, whatever it really is, cannot be made to appear before us in phenomenal reality under
the revealing lights of the television studio.  It, whatever it is, remains forever off screen, perhaps just
outside the frame of televisual phenomena, behind the curtain of the studio set, or held in the green room
down the hall.  The Kantian version of the game, therefore, would probably end with a distinctly Kantian
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admonishment.  Something like, 'Remember folks, what you see here is all you get.  Going further would
be a violation of the proper use of our reason.  Good night and see you next week.'  Although perfectly
consistent with the stipulations of the Critique of Pure Reason, such a program would not last very long,
mainly because we would not get the final revelation and pay-off.  We would, in effect, be forever denied
and barred from the 'the money shot.'
This Kantian reconfiguration provides for a much more attentive consideration of avatar identity
and computer-mediated social interaction.  Although it is commonly understood that an avatar often
exhibits characteristics that may not be anything like the real person who created and controls it, direct
and unmediated access to the real thing behind the avatar is in many cases impractical and effectively
inaccessible.  This does not mean, however, that there is no real human user behind the avatar; it just
means that one's access to this real thing is itself something that may not ever be realized or ascertained
as such.  As one participant in Boellstorff's (2008) empirical study of role-playing games aptly described
it, 'you never really know who is on the other side of the mask' (p. 130).  Kant, therefore, appears to
understand the predicament of the avatar much better than his Platonic predecessor, and this is borne out
by documented accounts of online identity crisis.  If we consider, for instance, the details of Stone's
account, it is evident that Julie's true identity was not ascertained by gaining access to the real person
behind the avatar.  Neither Stone nor the other users of the CMC system had ever met the real male
psychiatrist who presumably created and controlled this avatar.  Instead Julie's identity began to unravel
due to the rather slow accumulation, within the space of the virtual environment, of obvious
inconsistencies and seemingly irreconcilable contradictions.  The appearance of Julie, therefore,
eventually betrayed itself as nothing more than a mere appearance by getting tripped up in the material of
its own apparition.  And at some point the 'real person' behind Julie, an individual Stone (1995) later
identifies as 'Sanford Lewin' (p. 69), apparently decided to end the charade and reveal himself as such.  In
providing this revelation, which it should be noted occurred within the space and time of the computer
conference, Lewin finally unmasked Julie as a construct and came out to her online friends as a cross-
dressing psychiatrist.  But here is where things get exceedingly complicated, because this seemingly
fantastic tale is itself something of a fabrication.  As Stone (1995) notes, her account of the Julie incident
was based on an earlier publication, Lindsy Van Gelder's 'The Strange Case of the Electronic Woman,'
which was first published in Ms. magazine in 1985.  In retelling the story, Stone had not only taken some
liberties with the narrative but even altered the names of the participants.  'When I first wrote up my
version of the incident,' Stone (1995) explained, 'I used a pseudonym for the psychiatrist, and although
Van Gelder used his "real" (legal) name, I have retained the pseudonym in this version because my
treatment of him is quasifictional' (p. 191).  So even in Stone's text, at the point at which the real person
behind Julie (which it turns out was also a pseudonym—the name reported in the original Van Gelder
8
article was 'Joan Sue Green') would be identified, we do not get the real thing as it is in itself; we get
another fabrication and apparition.  The thing-in-itself, therefore, appears to be logically necessary but
fundamentally inaccessible and endlessly deferred.
The Parallax View
Kant's critical perspective, although providing for a more nuanced understanding of the situation, is not
immune to critique.  G. W. F. Hegel, for example, finds Kant's arguments to be unsatisfactory, but not for
the obvious reasons.  What Hegel objects to is not the characteristic Kantian modesty, that is, the
Prussian philosopher's seemingly stubborn insistence on the fundamental limitations of human
knowledge and its absolute inability to achieve access to the thing-in-itself in its unclothed nakedness.
Instead Hegel criticizes Kant for pulling punches, for not taking his own innovations and insights far
enough.  'It is Kant,' Žižek (2006) writes, 'who goes only halfway in his destruction of metaphysics, still
maintaining the reference to the Thing-in-itself as the externally inaccessible entity; Hegel is merely a
radicalized Kant, who takes the step from negative access to the Absolute to the Absolute itself as
negativity' (p. 27).  According to Žižek's reading, what Hegel finds unsatisfactory is the fact that the
Kantian philosophical revolution remains incomplete and unfulfilled.  For Kant, the thing-in-itself,
although forever inaccessible to finite human beings, is still thought of as a positive, substantive thing.
Hegel finds this both inadequate and inconsistent.  He therefore criticizes Kant not for insisting on the
necessarily limited capacity of human knowledge or the fundamental inaccessibility of the thing-in-itself,
but for wrongly presupposing that the thing-in-itself is some positive, substantive thing and missing the
fact that this thing is itself 'nothing but the inherent limitation of the intuited phenomena' (Žižek, 1993, p.
39).  'Where Kant thinks that he is still dealing only with a negative presentation of the Thing, we are
already in the midst of the Thing-in-itself—for this Thing-in-itself is nothing but this radical negativity.
In other words—in a somewhat overused Hegelian speculative twist—the negative experience of the
Thing must change into the experience of the Thing-in-itself as radical negativity' (Žižek, 1989, pp. 205-
206).
This Hegelian elaboration results in a much more complex conceptualization of the real.  'The
Real,' Žižek (2003) explains, 'is simultaneously the Thing to which direct access is not possible and the
obstacle that prevents this direct access; the Thing that eludes our grasp and the distorting screen that
makes us miss the Thing.  More precisely, the Real is ultimately the very shift of perspective from the
first standpoint to the second' (p. 77).  For Žižek (2006), then, the Real is 'purely parallactic' (p. 26).
From one angle it is perceived as the Thing to which direct access is not possible—a kind of Kantian
thing-in-itself.  'On a second approach, however, we should merely take note of how this radical
antinomy that seems to preclude our access to the Thing is already the Thing itself' (Žižek, 2003, p. 77).
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This changes not so much the structure but the outcome of the game.  In what would be a Žižekian
remake of To Tell the Truth, things would begin and proceed with little or no significant alteration.  A
celebrity panel would confront and interrogate three challengers, all of whom would make competing
claims to be the real thing.  The truth of the matter would, as in the Goodson/Todman production, be
withheld.  And because of this, the panel can only attempt to gain access to the real through an
engagement with the manifold and often conflicting appearances provided by the three challengers.  The
real difference becomes evident at the game's end, when the real thing is asked to stand and reveal itself
as such.  Here, as in the Kantian version, we do not get the naïve gratification of the Real making a final
and revealing appearance in phenomenal reality.  No one stands up.  The difference—the 'minimal
difference,' as Žižek (2006, p. 11) often calls it—comes immediately after or alongside this apparent
failure or lack of resolution.  The Žižekian game, unlike the Kantian version, would not conclude with a
rather unsatisfactory and somewhat disappointing admonishment.  In order for the game's ending to be
construed in this way, we would need, like Kant to presuppose and place value in the positive existence
of the thing itself.  We would still need to believe and have faith in the thing-in-itself.  Žižek's version,
however, would insists on 'tarrying with the negative,' with the fact that this apparent lack of resolution is
itself a resolution.  Or to put it another way, at the end of the program, when no one stands up, there is no
final and absolute revelation of the thing itself.  This lack of revelation, however, is itself revealing.
Through it, we come to see that the so-called real thing, which had been presupposed from the beginning
of the program and that had directed its development, is a kind of posed or posited fiction.  'This unique
procedure,' Žižek (2008a) writes in a passage that appears to address itself to the operations of the game
show, 'is the opposite of the standard revelation of the illusory status of (what we previously
misperceived as) part of reality: what is thereby asserted is rather, in a paradoxical tautological move, the
illusory status of the illusion itself—the illusion that there is some suprasensible noumenal Entity is
shown precisely to be an 'illusion', a fleeting apparition' (p. xxxv).  Consequently, what is revealed in the
Žižekian remake of the game is not a real thing standing above, behind, or outside of the play of
appearances and comprehending everything.  What is revealed is that this very expectation—an
expectation that has been inherited from Plato and that has, since that time, held an important and
controlling interest in Western intellectual history—is itself a metaphysical fantasy and fabrication.
This will obviously reorient the way we approach and understand online interaction, avatar
identity, and especially the relationship that has customarily been situated between the so-called 'real
world' and its apparitional others.  The real thing in computer-mediated experience has been, following
the tradition and standard protocols of Platonism, the presumed hard kernel that both resists and exists
outside the seemingly endless circulation of virtual images, digital appearances, and mediated
representations.  This is, as we have seen, a deep-seated assumption informing both the rhetoric and logic
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of computer-mediated experience in general and social interaction in particular.  Avatars, for instance,
are presumed to be the virtual proxy and delegate of a real person (Little, 1999; Apter, 2008) who sits
behind the screen and controls the apparent action.  'While the more fundamental personality of the real
person is still driving in the background,' Boellstorff (2008) writes, 'it's filtered through a different
surface persona' (p. 132).  The real thing, therefore, is thought to be the actual person who exists outside
the virtual environment and substantiates the apparent vicissitudes of identity that are represented by
different avatar configurations.  At the same time, however, this apparently fundamental and substantial
thing, if we are absolutely strict in our understanding of the situation and its proper epistemological
restrictions, turns out to be entirely virtual.  That is, the presumed 'real person' is, as Žižek argues, a
retroactively reconstructed virtuality that is fashioned from out of what was thought to be derivative and
subsequent appearances.  Understood in this way, the avatars that are encountered within the virtual
world are not the representatives and delegates of some independent and pre-existing real thing.  The
order of precedence must be reversed.  'The multiple perspectival inconsistencies between phenomena,'
as Žižek (2008a) puts it, 'are not an effect of the impact of the transcendental Thing—on the contrary, the
Thing is nothing but the ontologization of the inconsistency between phenomena' (pp. xxix-xxx).  
This is precisely what is documented in Stone's seminal 'boundary story.'  'Sanford Lewin,' as
Stone (1991) pointed out, was not strictly speaking a real person.  He was the ontologization of
inconsistencies that began to appear within the fabric of the virtual environment and the account that
Stone herself provided about this event.  For this reason, if we could ever peek behind the scenes or the
screen, what we would encounter is not the real thing with its pants down.  We would only discover, as
Žižek (2008a) writes with reference to a passage from Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, 'only what we
put there' (p. liv).  Consequently, when the decisive question—'Will the real body please stand up?'—is
asked, what we get is not necessarily what was expected or wanted.  What comes to be revealed is neither
the thing-in-itself available to us in some unmitigated immediacy nor the Kantian-brand disappointment
that is experienced in the face of a fundamental inability to expose the real as such.  Instead, what is
revealed is the lack of this kind of revelation and the way such expectations and assumptions are always
and already misguided and fantastic.  Perhaps the best and most obvious illustration of all this comes not
from the field of CMC but from the recent collapse of the world's financial institutions.  The value of our
money, say a single U.S. dollar, resides not in the ink and paper of the note that is carried in our wallets
and purses.  The note is just a proxy or delegate—a virtual stand-in for something else.  The real value of
our money is, so it has been assumed, established by and resides in the global financial markets.  What
the collapse of these markets demonstrates, then, is that this presumed real thing is itself something
entirely apparitional and constitutes what is, quite literally in this case, a virtual reality.  In late 2008, if
you asked the question 'will the real money pleases stand up?' what was revealed was not the real thing in
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itself.  What was revealed was the always and already illusory status of our very real investment in this
particular understanding and conceptualization of the real.
Keeping It Real
On the morning of 9 April 2008, I was, by virtue of one of my Second Life avatars, spending some time
on my university's island.  While wandering around the computer simulated buildings and meticulously
reproduced landscape of our virtual campus, I noticed two other avatars playing in the sandbox and
discussing the features of a rather large automobile-like object.  Since they were conversing in Polish, I
approached and greeted them with the standard casual salutation: 'Cześć, jak się masz?,' which is
something like the English 'Hey, how's it going?'  In response to this, one of the avatars turned and said to
me in a curious and telling mash-up of Polish and English, 'Cześć, keeping it real.'  This reply requires at
least two comments.  First, the American slang 'keeping it real' connotes authenticity and the lack of any
form of artifice.  As a linguistic token, however, the phrase must, it seems, be delivered in its assumed
original form, that is, in English and not translated into another language, like Polish.  This has been
done, it appears, in order to deliver this statement about authenticity with a certain authenticity.  In other
words, what is conveyed by the phrase 'keeping it real' would not be truly real unless it was delivered in a
way that was authentic and was itself 'keeping it real.'  In providing his response in English, therefore, the
avatar was 'keeping it real' in both word and deed.  But, and this is the second point, what would it mean
for an avatar to be 'keeping it real?'  What does 'keeping it real' mean when spoken or keyed by a virtual
construct in an artificial, computer-generated environment like Second Life?  Is this ironic?  Is it a
contradiction?  Or is it one of those unfortunate moments, as comedian Dave Chappell has described it,
'when keeping it real goes wrong?'  Let me, therefore, conclude by noting three consequences of  'keeping
it real' in computer-mediated social interaction.
First, everything depends on how we define and operationalize the concept of the real.  Even
though online role playing games, social networks, and other forms of avatar-based CMC are often
considered to be merely a matter of entertainment, they are involved in serious debates about and
meditations on fundamental aspects of metaphysics.  And in these situations there appears to be, as there
are in many facets of computing, a default setting.  This default has been programmed and is controlled
by Platonism, which institutes a distinction between the real thing and its phenomenal appearances.  In
computer-mediated interaction, like online role-playing games and immersive social environments, this
Platonic decision is particularly manifest in the discussions and debates surrounding avatar identity and
the seemingly indisputable fact that what appears in the space of the virtual world are manipulated
representations of real human users, who may themselves be entire different from how they appear in the
computer-generated environment.  As long as our research endeavors remain within and proceed
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according to this Platonic formulation, which as a default setting is often operative without having to
select or specify it, we already know what questions matter, what evidence will count as appropriate, and
what outcomes will be acceptable.  This rather comfortable and well-established theoretical position,
however, comes to be disturbed by the critical interventions of Kant, who it appears, is much more
perceptive about the facts on the ground.  Kant reaffirms the Platonic distinction between the real thing
as it is in itself and its various mediated apparitions that appear within phenomenal reality.  But unlike
the Platonist, Kant harbors considerable doubt as to whether this real thing is ever accessible as it truly is
in itself.  This does not mean, however, that Kant simply denies the existence of the real; he is just
agnostic about it.  That is, he sticks to his methodological guns and stubbornly refuses to admit knowing
anything about something that remains, by definition, fundamentally inaccessible and out of reach.  On
the Kantian account, therefore, it is assumed that there is a real person behind the avatar, but because
these online applications now have a global reach, it seems rather improbable that one would ever have
unmitigated access to the real person behind the scene/screen.  Žižek, who finds this Kantian innovation
to be a crucial turning point, take things one step further.  Following the Hegelian critique of Kant's
critical philosophy, Žižek transforms the Kantian negative experience of the Thing-in-itself into the
experience of the Thing-in-itself as radical negativity.  For Žižek, then, the real is already a virtual
construct, and the difference between the real and the virtual turns out to be much more complicated and
interesting.  Consequently, 'it is not,' as Boellstorff (2008) concludes, 'that virtual worlds borrowed
assumptions from real life: virtual worlds show us how, under our very noses, our 'real' lives have been
'virtual' all along' (p. 5).
Second, in the face of these three competing theories of the real, one might understandably ask
which is true.  Or to put it in the parlance of the game show, one could ask of the three contestants, will
the real real please stand up?  This inquiry, although informed by what appears to be good common
sense, is already a loaded question insofar as it employs and relies upon the very thing that is asked
about.  Žižek's understanding of the real stands out insofar as it comprehends and complicates this
inquiry.  'The 'truth,''  Žižek (2003) writes, 'is not the "real" state of things, that is, the "direct" view of the
object without perspectival distortion, but the very Real of the antagonism that causes perspectival
distortion.  The site of truth is not the way "things really are in themselves," beyond their perspectival
distortions, but the very gap, passage, that separates one perspective from another, the gap that makes the
two perspectives radically incommensurable…There is a truth; everything is not relative—but this truth
is the truth of the perspectival distortion as such, not the truth distorted by the partial view of a one-sided
perspective' (p. 79).  For Žižek, then, truth no longer resides in what is assumed to be the 'real state of
things.'  On his account, this kind of direct and undistorted access to the real, which is one of the standard
operating presumptions of both To Tell the Truth and What's My Line?, has been and remains a mere
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metaphysical game.  Instead truth, according to Žižek's reconceptualization of the real, must be
characterized according to what Hegel calls 'speculative reason."  For Hegel, 'speculative' is not, as is
typically the case in colloquial discourse, a pejorative term meaning groundless consideration or idle
review of something that is often inconclusive and indeterminate.  Instead, Hegel understands and utilizes
the word 'speculative' in its strict etymological sense, which is derived from the Latin noun speculum.
'Speculative,' therefore, designates a form of self-reflective knowing.  For Žižek in particular, this means
explicitly recognizing the way what comes to be enunciated is always and already conditioned by the
situation or place of enunciation.  'At the level of positive knowledge,' Žižek (2008b) writes, 'it is, of
course, never possible to (be sure that we have) attain(ed) the truth—one can only endlessly approach it,
because language is ultimately self-referential, there is no way to draw a definitive line of separation
between sophism, sophistic exercises, and Truth itself (this is Plato's problem).  Lacan's wager is here the
Pascalean one: the wager of Truth.  But how?  Not by running after "objective" truth, but by holding onto
the truth about the position from which one speaks' (p. 3).  The strategic advantage of this particular
approach, then, is not that it provides one with privileged and immediate access to the object in its raw or
naked state but that it continually conceptualizes the place from which one claims to know anything and
submits to investigation the particular position that is occupied by any epistemological claim whatsoever.
Finally, what this means for the study of avatars and computer-mediated social interaction is an
end to a certain brand of theoretical naivety.  The choice of theory, especially a theory of the real, which
is always at play and operationalized in considerations of virtual environments, is never certain and is
always open to considerable variation and debate.  But the choice is always a choice (even in those
circumstances where one operates according to the default setting and is not conscious of having made a
decision), and it needs to be explicitly understood and articulated as such.  This is necessary, because a
decision concerning theory already and in advance determines the kinds of questions one asks, the
evidence s/he believe will count as appropriate, and the range of solutions that are recognized as possible.
The English word 'theory,' as we are often reminded, is derived from the ancient Greek theōrein, which
denotes the act of seeing or vision.  A theory, therefore, like the frame of a camera, always enables
something to be seen by including it within the field of vision, but it also and necessarily excludes other
things outside the edge of its frame.  We can, for instance, justifiably employ the default Platonic
conceptualization, and it will, in many circumstances, prove to be entirely serviceable.  This is, for
example, the current situation in many of the discussions of avatar identity, where researchers affirm
(with little or no critical hesitation) the fact that 'users can,' as Taylor (2006) describes it, 'construct
identities that may or may not correlate to their offline persona' (p. 95).  This ability to manipulate and
reconfigure one's identity has been either celebrated as a significant advantage and gain for the real
people who use the technology, or it is criticized for the way it facilitates deception, anti-social behavior,
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and problematic forms of identity tourism.  What the two sides of this debate share, despite their many
differences, is an underlying belief in and dedication to the real, specifically, the real person who, it is
assumed, exists behind the avatar in the so-called 'real world.'  As Stone (1991) emphatically reminds us,
'no matter how virtual the subject may become, there is always a body attached' (p. 111).  This essentially
Platonic arrangement, even though it is put in question and significantly complicated by both the Kantian
critical perspective and Žižek's recent innovations in the ontology of the real, works in this admittedly
limited context.  Like Newtonian physics, which, although superceded by Einstein's work in relativity, is
still entirely serviceable for calculating load and stress in structural engineering, there are some areas in
which the Platonic theory of the real is entirely appropriate and applicable.  Its employment, however,
must be understood to be limited to a highly constrained context and not something that can be, on this
basis of this particular success, generalized beyond this specific situation to cover each and every
circumstance.  Consequently, we must explicitly recognize that this particular application of theory, like
the choice of any tool or instrument, cannot be unconsciously accepted as merely given, somehow
natural, and beyond critical self-reflection.  In other words, we need to understand, as Žižek puts it, how
the position of enunciation already influences and informs what comes to be enunciated.  What the
Žižekian perspective provides, therefore, is not the one true understanding of the real, but a
conceptualization of the real that realizes that the real is itself something which is open to considerable
variability, ideological pressures, and some messy theoretical negotiations.  The real problem, then, is not
that investigators of computer-mediated social interaction have used one theory of the real or another.
The problem is that researchers have more often than not utilized theory without explicitly recognizing
which one or considering why one comes to be employed as opposed to another.  For this reason, the real
problem with virtual environments and online social interaction is not, as it is so often assumed, a matter
of our understanding or misunderstanding of the virtual.  The real problem has to do with the real.
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